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INTRODUCTION
Statelessness is a condition in which an individual has no citizenship or nationality1 in
any country . Nationality is a legal relationship between an individual and a state that "confers

The tenn "nationality" can be used to mean citizenship or identification with an historical nation of origin other
than the nation in which the individual is a citizen or permanently resides. For purposes ofthis paper. nationality
will be used without qualification to mean citizenship. To indicate the second meaning of nationality. ethnicity or
nationality of origin will be referenced.

mutual rights and duties on boW2 and has been called "man's basic right, for it is nothing less
than the right to have rights."3
Under --domestic
law,
.
_.. it is the prerequisite for the realization of
.- _ .
,

-.

other fundamental rights, because, as'a matter of definition, without affiliation with a state one
has no mechanism or context in which to exercise rights or duties, not only resulting in problems
pertaining to the ability to work, access to social services, housing, etc., but also to obtaining
documentation allowing exit from or re-entry to the country. In addition, although states could
be seen as merely an organizational tool of human beings, at customary international law, there

has been no practical recognition of human beings except through states, and thus stateless
individuals lack the protections provided by states to their citizens abroad, such as diplomatic
~
law is
assistance, and thus have no rights in the international c o r n ~ n i t y .'?nternational
essentially rendered inoperable for the stateless indi~idual."~
Law pertaining to statelessness in the modem international community has evolved from
a non-issue prior to the Twentieth Century, when it first became a notable problem, to

recognition that nationality is a Eundamental human right.

Currently, international law is

attempting to assert an obligation on states prohibiting statelessness. In addition, a trend can be
identified that may be leading ultimately to recognition of a right of an individual to a nationality
based on his or her subjective priorities and self-identification. This paper will begin by
reviewing the origin of the problem of statelessness and the history of the development of

Jeffrey L. Blackman, State Successions And Sratelessness: The Emerging Right To An Eflective Nationality Under
International Law, 19 MICH. J. INT'L L. 1 141, 1 148 (1998).
Id, quoting former Chief Justice of the U.S. Supreme Court Earl Warren.
4

See Ruta M . Kalvaitis, Citizenship And National Identify In The Baltic States, 16 B.U.INT'L L.J.23 l,251 (1998).
Blackman, supra note 2, at 1 150.

international law pertaining to statelessness. It will then analyze two case studies in which

-.-

\

and IsraeWalestine. These case studies will
statelessness continues unresolved, the Baltic _States
-.
..

illustrate two types of statelessness, the international law relevant to each situation, and the
stance the United Nations has taken to try to resolve the problem. The final section will discuss
the commonalities and differences of the two cases in light of a growing body of human rights
coming to be recognized by international law.

I. THE PROBLEM OF STATELESSNESS
Origin
Statelessness is primarily a Twentieth Century phenomenon. Prior to World War I,
statelessness was limited to unusual individual circumstances. As a result of the Peace Treaties
following the war breaking up the empires, the League of Nations, controlled by Western
powers, promulgated the model of the nation-state, which was intended to replace the old laws of
/-\

feudal society and was based on the principle of equality of all citizens before the law.6
However, the League of Nations drew the boundaries of the new nation-states without regard to
national identification of the inhabitants of the territory, creating "state-nationals", who held the

ruling power, other "nationals", and officially recognized "minorities".'

The scheme included

Minority Treaties imposed on the new successor states, although not on conquered states like
~ e r m a n ~These
. ~ treaties setup protections under the auspices of the League for groups of
minorities that met a certain profile and thus were labeled "minorities" for purposes of the
trea~ies.~These groups made up an average of 30% of the new states' populations (or

See HANNAH
ARENDT, THE ORIGINSOF TOTALITARIANISM
290 (3d ed.

'Id. at 270.
See id. at 269.

See id. at 270-27 1.

1973).

approximately 30 mil~ion).'~However, other non-state "nationals" constituted up to 20% of a
,+'--I

state's population." Thus, up to 50% of
the --popplation was not represented by the government
-..
controlled by the state-nationals.
.

'

An effect of the minority treaty scheme was that the implication prior to the war that only

state-nationals could be citizens of a given state was in essence crystallized as an accepted norm.
That is because the scheme explicated that minority interests could only be protected by an
institution external to the state, in this case the League of Nations, instead of the state, unless and
until the minority was completely assimilated, and thus divorced from its origin.I2 This
environment caused resentment by the new states and a general non-compIiance with the treaties,
as well as discontent among the unrepresented nationalities, each considering the treaties

arbitrary in "handing out rule to some and servitude to

other^."'^

Revolutions and civil wars

caused many to flee their states, which then de-nationalized the refigees en masse. This resulted
in the statelessness of millions of Russians, hundreds of thousands of Armenians, thousands of

Hungarians,hundreds of thousands of Germans and over a half million Spaniards, among others,
during the inter-war years. l 4 The new attitude taken by the new states was that, if they were not
yet actually totalitarian, at the least they would not tolerate opposition and would rather lose
citizens than harbor people with different viewpoints."
Although control of access to territory by non-citizens was a matter completely within a
state's sovereignty under international law, common interests of states, on a practical level,

'Osee id. at 27 1.
II

See id. at 272.

l2

see id. at 275.

l 3 Id. at 270-271.
14

See id. at 278.

l5 See

id. at 278.

historically had "restrained" this assertion of sovereignty.'6

This comity of nations was

-1

_

destroyed by the First World War a . by the imposition
-.
of the terms of the Peace Treaties and
..

Minority Treaties, which led to a spate of laws allowing de-naturalization and de-nationalization

in certain circumstances and an eroding of the presumption of the inviolability of citizen status
by a citizen's state, even in Western ~ u r o ~ e . "
The two perceived solutions to the refugee problem-repatriation

or naturalization-not

only failed but added to the problem of statelessness. Repatriation was not an option where
refugees' origin states refused to admit them."

In addition, where origin states would accept

their refugees back, refbgees who were at risk of political persecution or legal sanction or had
lost their genuine and effective links with the origin state sought refuge amongst the stateless to
avoid repatriation."
Naturalization encountered unprecedented problems due to the sheer numbers of
,/-,,

refugees. Although a few were naturalized, administrative agencies were not equipped to handle
either the volume or persons of stateless status.20 In addition, as time went on, in the face of the

influx of hundreds of thousands of refugees to any given country, the right of asylum
traditionally recognized appeared to be an anachronism not suited to modern conditions, and,
moreover, not supported by any written law--constitutions, international agreements, or even the
Covenant of the League of ~ a t i o n s . ~Instead
'
of continuing the naturalization process, in many

16

Id. at 278.

17

See id. at 279,290.

l8

see id. at 283-284.
See id. at 278.

19

20
21

See id at 284-285.
See id. at 280.

cases states simply cancelled the naturalizations already granted.22 As a result of these

_

dynamics, although de ._jure
was
initially a much smaller problem, refugees who
_ statelessness
. .
---..

'

'

held de jure nationalities became de facto stateless as a result of their origin states' r e h a l s to
recognize them and the inability of host states to accommodate them.23
Without the right to a residence or the right to work, the stateless were constantly in
violation of the host states' laws trying to support themselves and their families, and subject to

I

internment without hearing or ~entence.'~Without other means of providing protection, many
host states turned the whole stateless populace (prior to World War 11, about 10 percent of the
population25)over to the police to rule directly.26 This increase in the power of the police led to
a gradual consolidation of police power, even to a sort of fraternalization of police across
bo~ndaries,'~
which consolidation may have been a major factor leading to so little resistance by
police in Nazi-occupied co~ntries.~'
This period between the wars established an attitudinal and factual precedent that the
international community has not yet resolved. Although, as set out below, the United Nations

and some regional treaties have begun to articulate international norms providing for a human
right to citizenship, as a practical matter statelessness continues to be endemic.

See id at 285.
23 See id.

at 279.

24

See id at 2 86.

25

see id. at 288.

26

See id. at 287.

2 7 ~ eid.
e at 288.
2B

See id. at 289.

Legal Status of Statelessness at International Law

Although the right
- .to a nationality has -been
recognized at least theoretically since 1948,
-..
.'

y.

the international willingness to limit traditional sovereign power relating to nationality is only
now beginning to be manifested. For centuries and through the first half of the Twentieth

Century, nationality was determined to be solely a matter of domestic law. It was not until PostWorld War I1 that the right to a nationality was articulated as an international concern.
The right to a legal nationality (citizenship) was first set out in Article 15 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights of 1948; the principles of which have over time come to be
accepted as norms of customary international law.29 Article 15 states that "[elveryone has the
right to a nationality" and "[nlo one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality nor denied the
right to change his nationality.''30 However, it lays out no guiding principles. Nor does it state
the negative corollary that statelessness is violative of human rights.
,-

The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights of 1966 (entered into force in
1976), which was intended to be one of two instruments giving binding effect to the Universal

Declaration, is silent on the Declaration's Article 15 right to nationality, but mentions in Article
24, covering children's rights, that "[elvery child has the right to a nationa~it~."~'
Like the

Declaration, however, the Covenant fails to articulate a mechanism to effectuate the provision.
Nor does it state the negative corollary p~oscribingstatelessness.

Universal Declaration of Human Rights, art. 15, G.A. Res. 2 17 A (III), U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess., pr. I , U.N. Doc.
A/8 10, at 7 l(1948) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].

O'

31

International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted Dec. 19, 1966, entered intoJorce, Mar. 23, 1976),
art. 24,999 U.N.T.S. 17 1, 179 [hereinafter CFR Covenant].

Two United Nations conventions specifically address statelessness. The first was the
-.- Persons of 1954 (Status onv vent ion)^^ (entered
. Status of Stateless
Convention Relating tq -the
.

.

into force in 1960). It does not assen the right to nationality or address prevention or
rectification of statelessness, but it deals with treatment and protections of stateless persons. The
Status Convention broadens the definition of stateless33to a "person who is not considered as a
national by any State under the operation of its law" (Article 1) and requires a stateless person to
abide by the laws of his or her host country (Article 2 1 . ~ It~ reciprocally obligates the host
country, inter alia, to non-discrimination (Article 3) and to provide ''the same treatment as is
accorded to aliens generally,)' except where the Convention affords more favorable provisions
(often certain rights accorded the country's own nationals) (Article 7), documentation (Articles
27 and 28) and security from arbitrary expulsion (Article 3 I).~'

The second, the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness of 1 9 6 1 (Reduction
~~
Convention) (entered into force in 1975) obliges a state party to "grant its nationality to a person
born in its territory who would otherwise be stateless" (Article 1(1)1~~ and to grant nationality to
a person not born in its territory, but has a parent who has nationality, if the person would

Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons (adopted Sept. 28, 1954, entered intoforce Jun. 6, I960),
360 U.N.T.S. 130 [hereinafter Stahls Convention].
32 Convention

The Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees recognizes only stateless persons that are refugees and
establishes protections to both categories of rehgees without distinction. See generally, Convention Relating to the
Status of Refigees (adopted July 28, 1951, entered intoforce April 22, 1954), 189 U.N.T.S.150. Simultaneous to
drafting this Convention, the United Nations also drafted a Protocol relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, but
declined to sign it, instead referring it back for hrther study. See Final Act of the 1951 United Nations Conference
of Plenipotentiaries on the Status ofRefugees and Stateless Persons, art. 111, 189 U.N.T.S. 137, 144.
33

34

36

See Status Convention, supra note 32, at 136.

Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness (adopted Aug. 30, 1961, entered intoforce Dec. 13, 1975), 989
U.N.T.S. 175 [hereinafter Reduction Convention].

otherwise be stateless (Article 4(1)).38 It goes on to prohibit depriving a person of his nationality
,,-

,

if it would render him .s$teless (Article 8(l)j39 p r for discriminatory reasons (Article 9140 and
.
requires that treaties for transfer of territory have provisions such that no person shall become
A

-

.

stateless as a result or that, in the absence of such provisions, the acquiring state shall confer its
nationality on those as would otherwise become stateless (Article 1o).~'

The Organization of American States iterates in the American Convention on Human
Rights of 1969 in Article 20 that "[elvery person has the right to the nationality of the State in
whose territory he was born if he does not have the right to any other nationality" and prohibits
arbitrary deprivation.42 In addition, the Council of Europe has onIy recently concluded the

European Convention on Nationality of 1 9 9 7 . ~Its~ Article 4 states, inter alia, that: "everyone
has a right to a nationality?', "statelessness shall be avoided" and "no one shall be arbitrarily
deprived of his nati~nalit~?'.~
Although it remains to be seen what the legal effect will be on
Eastern European countries who obtained independence prior to the convention, it, like the
American Convention, is another indication of crystallization of international norms.

Therefore, it may be argued that the broad right to nationality is a norm of customary
international law as shown by the Universal Declaration and supplemented by United Nations
and major regional conventions. Despite this recognition of the general right to a nationality, as
a practical matter citizenship laws have always been considered to be under a state's domestic
3s

See id. at 177-178.

39

See id. at 179.

40

See id

4'

See id

42

American Convention on Human Rights (adoptedNov. 22,

1969, entered intoforce July 18, 1978),art. 20, 1144

U.N.T.S.144, 150.
Kalvaitis, supra note 4, at 249, citing European Convention on Nationality, Nov. 6, 1997, Eur. T.S. No 166,37
I.L.M.44.

43

44

Id, art. 4.

.-..,

jurisdiction. Thus, protecting individuals' nationality status is in tension with the prohibition
against interference in -"matters
which-.ate. essentially
within the domestic jurisdiction of any
+-..
I

.

state".45 Perhaps because of this conflict of principles and the difficulty of articulating solutions,
there is a lack of uniformity of state practice regarding conferring of nationality, which results in

an inability of the international community to attribute lex lata ("firmlaw") status to the broader
issues of states' positive obligation to confer nationality.

However, new activities in

international law show a growing trend toward a "presumption" that a state may have a negative
obligation not to create statelessr~ess.~~
Nationality and statelessness have also been addressed in two new United Nations
conventions, the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties (1978) and
the Vienna Convention on Succession of States in Respect of State Property (1983), but neither
of them have entered into force.47 Moreover, of course, even if these conventions were in force,
they would not be binding upon successor states not signatory to them; indeed, those states
would be bound only by norms of customary international law.48 To address this problem, the
United Nations General Assembly has begun to attempt to codify customary law in this area by
assigning the International Law Commission ("ILC") to report on "state succession and its
impact on the nationality of natural and legal persons.'*g The ILC prepared and submitted to the
General Assembly in 1997 Draft Articles on Nationality in Relation to the Succession of States
intended to constitute a General Assembly resolution and perhaps lead to a c o n ~ e n t i o n . ~ ~

45

U.N.CHARTER,art. 2, para. 7.

46

See Blackman, supra note 2, at 1183.

47

See id. at 1142.

d8

See id. at 1 142-1 143.

49 id.

at 1143.

'Osee id. at 1143.

What is new as evidenced in the documents and the supporting deliberations is the stated
realization by the ILC agd- the General AssembJ;s

Sixth Committee (on Legal Matters) that the

-.

law of state succession must take into account the evolving norms of international human rights
law pertaining, inter alia, to statelessness, the right to a nationality, and the principle of non-

discrimination. The ILC concluded that state succession with respect to nationality "involved the
basic human right to a nationality, so that obligations for States stemmed from the duty to respect
that right

Furthermore, parallelkg trends in human rights law and interpretations of the

U.N. Charter, the Draft Articles depart significantly from the long-held view that international
,
'

law "places few, if any, restraints on states' discretion over nationality issues."52
However, there is a crack in the hard she1.l of sovereignty regarding such discretion that
supports the Draft Articles' departure. The International Court of Justice (ICJ) recognized a
"delirnit[ation of] the competence of States" in the area of discretion pertaining to nationaIity
-,.,

;

under a concept known as "effective nationality".

In the Nottebohm Case (Liechtenstein v.

~ u a t e r n a l a )the
, ~ ~Court held that Guatemala was not required to recognize Liechtenstein's claim

to represent Nottebohm as his country of citizenship in front of the ICJ against Guatemala.
Nottebohm was a German national whom Liechtenstein had naturalized, but who lived in
Guatemala for thirty-four years.

The ICJ said that Guatemala was entitled to continue to

recognize his German nationality, since the primary purpose of naturalization by Liechtenstein
was for Nottebohm to come under its protection rather than to attach to its traditions, way of life

" Id.
52
53

at

1143-1144.

Id. at 1144.

Notiebohm Case (Liechtemrein v. Guatemala), 119551 I.C.J . Rep. 4 <http://www.icj-cij.org/icjwww/
idecisions/isummaries/ilgsummary550406.hm~

or obligations. Thus, the Court said, he lacked genuine and effective links to Liechtenstein; or in
f

other words, he did not establish
effective
n a t i-.~ n a l i.t y . ~ ~
.. .
/

,

.

.

The Draft Articles would impose positive obligations on states based on the principle of
effective nationality, which would require successor states to grant nationality to those persons

who have established genuine and effective Iinks through 1) habitual residence on the new
tenitory; 2) prior nationality or secondary nationality in the predecessor state; or 3) entitlement
to acquire nationality in the predecessor state.55 The Articles would also oblige states to allow a

right of option-for those who would be entitled to acquire the nationality of at least two successor
states, based on effective links of domiciliary, nationality, familial or secondary nationality

characteristic^.'^

Thus, the Draft Articles use a mix of criteria to determine effective nationality,

with emphasis on domicile fjus soli), but also including prior nationality, prior secondary
nationality, and familial links (jus s a n g ~ i n i s ) . ~ ~
. .
However, the Draft Articles are not yet descriptive of Iex lata, as the principles are
lacking the required state practice and opinio juris. On the other hand, they indicate the rapid
development of international law in the area of statelessne~s.~~
The international community's attempts to rectify the problem of statelessness had limited
impact on the actual practice of new, possibly ethnocentric, states that arose after World War 11.
Such lack of impact led to different forms of statelessness many of which at this time are yet to
be solved.

54

See id

55

See Blackman, supra note 2, at 1 165-1 168.

56

See id at 1 169.

57

See id.at 1 170.

58

See id.at 1 170.

11. CASE STUDIES

Two examples where statelessness as.a
.-.- result of state succession has occurred are the
.

Baltic States-Lithuania,

.

Latvia and Estonia--after regaining their independence from the

former Soviet Union in 1991 and IsraeYPalestine since Israel declared its sovereignty in 1948.
These examples also illustrate the different forms statelessness can take based upon the character
and means of the particular state succession.
The Baltics
Pre-Independence History of Baltic States
As of 1991, the Baltic Region had inherited two law traditions+ach

Soviet, independent law and the Soviet Union's federal law-and

country's pre-

had developed a Russian

minority population not in existence at the time of the Soviet take over during World War 11.
Although Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia were at the turn of the Twentieth Century a part of the
..-\

Russian Empire, the countries had a prior history as sovereign states. Following the Bolshevik

Revolution they each declared their independence and during the period between the two World
Wars established stable foundations as independent, parliamentary democracies. However, all
three parliamentary democracies were overthrown by nationalistic authoritarian regimes in the'

1920s and 1 9 3 0 s . ~In
~ 1938, Germany and the USSR signed the Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression
Pact which put the Baltic States under the "sphere[] of influence" of the Soviets, and in 1940 the
USSR invaded them, completing their transition to Soviet Republics,by 1 944.60

The effect of the Soviet policy of "russification" on population demographics of the three
countries was significant. The Soviet government required that the Russian language be used in
all official matters, including higher education and government; altered history to exaggerate the

59

See KaIvaitis, supra note 4, at 233-234.

60

Id, at 234-235.

Russian-Bdtic link and banned mention of a separate Baltic identity in literature; sent in waves
r

>7

of Russian, Ukrainian and
- - ByeIorussian
. . settlers; ,andsimultaneously deported large numbers of
_-.'

~ h e s eacts dramatically changed the ethnic makeup of the

Baits to Siberian labor

(Interestingly, Lithuania increased its "indigenous" percentage and lowered its
"other minorities" category, while increasing its "Russian" percentage and increasing its total
population by 4 0 % . ~ ~ )
During the 1980s and until 1991, President MikhaiI Gorbachev introduced
and glasnosf6sto the USSR, which resulted in, inter alia, a push by a number of Soviet republics,

including the three Baltics, for their independence, which push Gorbachev resisted. The three
Baltic States declared their independence in 1990, and in 1991, following the attempted military
overthrow of Gorbachev and the ensuing change in Soviet leadership, their independence was

6I

See id at 235-236.

62 See id at 236. Note that the population percentages of the respective republics changed from inter-war censuses
to 1989, a 50-60 year period, as follows:

Lithuania
1989

Inter-War
Indigenous

Latvia

62.9%

p
p

Russian

Other
Total Poplm.
63

2.5%

9.4%

28.3%

1 1 .O%

2,620,000

3,675,000

Inter-War

1989

75.5%

52.0%

Inter-War
88.2%

-

10.6%

34.0%

8.2%

30.3%

13.9%

14.2%

3.6%

8.2%

1,905,000

2,680,000

1,136,000

1,576,000

Id. at 236, table reproduced supra note 62.

"Restructuring" -policy of legal restructuring of Soviet Union, including, inter alia, a recognition and
incorporation into domestic law of international law and increased participation in the international community, as
well as movement toward democratization. See Richard C. Vjsek, Creating The Ethnic Electorate Through Legal
Restororionism: Citizenship Rights In Eslonia, 38 HARV.
IW'L L.J. 3 15, 322 (1 997).
64

65 "Openness" -policy of more transparency and accountability in Soviet government as well as easing restraints
on freedom of expression, etc. See id.

recognized by the USSR (as well as most Western states).66 One month later. the Soviet Union

was dissolved.

- -

-

.

--..

.?

..

-.

Since the three Baltic States attained their independence fiom the Soviet Union, at the
moment of dissolution of the Soviet Union, persons with Soviet citizenship, but without
citizenship in individual Soviet republics, became de jure stateless.

These persons heId

citizenship in a state that was now defunct. There were three nationality possibilities, each with
different levels of viability depending on the laws of the Baltic State in which the stateless found
themselves: 1) take citizenship in the state of their residency, which state may have strict
residency and language requirements for naturalization; 2) accept Russian citizenship and lose
certain rights and privileges reserved for republic citizens; or 3) become stateless, losing even the
right to have rights.67
Baltic Nationality Laws
.\',

Upon independence, the Baltic States were in a position to determine their own
citizenship laws, subject only to international normative parameters.

International Iaw

distinguishes between a state that is a legal continuation of a prior state (accession) and a state
that takes the place of another state (succession). The former carries the rights and duties of the

prior state, while the latter establishes its rights and obligations anew.68 Each Baltic State
considered itself to have regained its former independence and thus to be a continuation of the
pre-1940 republic. This was supported by the fact that most Western states, including the United
States, had never recognized the forced Soviet incorporation of the Baltics and continued de jure

66

Kalvaitis, supra note 4, at 238-239.

67 See
68

id. at 240-24 1.

See id. at 24 1.

1

recognition of their independence throughout the Soviet occupation.69 Latvia and Estonia in
- _ since
_ . . the Soviet occupation was illegal, it could not create a legal
particular considered that
?.

.

--.-

.

regime (ex iniuria ius non oritur)."'Thus, they attempted to restore their prior sovereignty
(restitutio ad integrum) by reinstating their prior laws, including citizenship, before drafiing new
legislation,71 However, it can also be asserted that fifty years of Soviet occupation had its effects
and cannot now be ignored, despite its illegality, and restitutio ad integrum may not be possible.
Long-standing circumstances, even though illegal, "crystallize" over time to become legal (ex
factis ius orit~r).'~Lithuania acknowledged this latter principle by re-enacting its pre-Soviet
constitution but then immediately suspending it, enacting a Provisional Fundamental Law, which
operates today.73
Latvia. With a population that is 48% non-indigenous and 34% ethnic Russians (total

population 2,680,000) in 1989,'~ Latvia's final revised legislation was the most restrictive
naturalization law of the Baltic States. The Law was not passed until July 22, 1994, three years
after independence. The law provides automatic citizenship for persons who were citizens of the
Republic of Latvia (pre-Soviet Latvia) on June 17, 1940, and their descendants, and for orphans
who had no parents or whose parents were unknown.75 Others may be naturalized if they meet
strict requirements: 1) five years' residence after May 1990; 2) basic knowledge of the Latvian
language, constitution and history; 3) oath of loyalty to Latvia; 4) legal source of income; and 5) .

69 See id. at
'O

See id. at 242.

" See
72

235.

id.

See id. at 242-243.

73 See

id. at 243.

74

See id. at 236.

75

See id.at 255-256.

renunciation of any other citizenship. In addition, the law'provides for categories of persons to
---\

to categories beginning in 1996
be established, and natu_ra!ization to occur in stages.according
.

2

-,

and ending 2003,~~
Under this regime, for example, a 45-year-old person who did not qualify for
automatic citizenship could not apply for naturalization until the year 2000, even though he was
born and lived his entire life in Latvia, leaving him stateless for ten years.77
Those ineligible for naturalization under any circumstances included individuals who: 1)
acted against the state in violation of the constitution or held membership in organizations that
were judicially found to have done so, or were judicially decreed to have propagated fascist,
communist or other totalitarian ideas or have stirred up ethnic or racial discord; 2) are officials of

a foreign state; 3) serve in the armed forces or security service of a foreign state or served in the
USSR anned forces, unless they were permanent residents of Latvia at time of conscription; 4)

were employees, informants or agents of the KGB or other foreign intelligence agency; 5) have

,'1
been convicted of an intentional act considered by Latvia to be a crime requiring a prison
sentence of longer than one year.78
Latvia does, however, issue identity and travel documentation to stateless persons who
are permanent residents."
Estonia. Estonia's non-indigenous population in 1989 was 38% and 30% ethnic Russian
(total population 1,576,000). This republic retained its 1938 Law on Citizenship, with some
amendments, which provides that citizenship is granted: 1) by birth, 2) to persons "recognized
Naturalization requirements include: 1) having
as Estonian citizens"; and 3) by naturali~ation.~~
76 See
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See id. at 257-258.
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achieved age of majority (18 years); 2) two years' residency in Estonia prior to application and
one year after; 3) knowledge of the Estonian language. Language and residency requirements
-

.

>.

'

--

.

may be waived for stateless persons who have ten years' residency prior to application and for
invalids and the elderly."
Estonia also passed a Law on Aliens which applies to foreign nationals and stateless
persons. It provides for residence permits, allows permanent residents to vote in local, but not
national elections, and allows persons with Soviet passports and Estonian residence permits,
inter alia, to exit and enter the republic freely. The law also forbids issuance of permanent

residency permits to: 1) foreign professional military personnel or those who have served in a
foreign armed service and entered Estonia through such service or upon retirement from it; 2)
former employees of the KGB or other foreign intelligence agencies; 3) convicts who have been
sentenced to more than a year's imprisonment and who are "not considered rehabilitated with a
spent conviction"; 4) persons who do not respect the Estonian constitutional system or obey its
laws or who have acted against the Estonian state and its security; and 5) persons who provided
false information on a permit or visa application.82 These same persons are barred from ever
qualifying for Estonian citizenship, since at least three years of permanent residency is required
to be granted citizenship.83
Estonia does, however, have one unique constitutional provision that allows permanent
residents to vote in local elections, which can result in some protection for stateless persons'
interests at the local
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Lithuania.

Lithuania had the unique experience of decreasing its non-indigenous

_

:-7

population from 37% dying the Inter-War.period
_..
to just 20% in 1989, while its total population
-.

grew by 40%, from 2,620,000 to 3,675,000. Its ethnic Russian population grew from 2.5% to
9.5%, while its other non-indigenous population fell from 28% to 1 1%.85 Perhaps because of

this stability of its native population, Lithuania promulgated more liberal naturalization policies
than the other two Baltic, States. It established its first citizenship law in 1989, well before it
declared its independence. It was a cbzero-option''g6law that provided the opportunity for any
permanent resident of the Lithuania SSR with two years' residence, a legal source of income,
and a declaration of allegiance to the Lithuanian constitution to register for citizenship,

regardless of nationality or language ability. The deadline was November 1991. Only 10% of
non-indigenous permanent residents opted not. to take citizenship, representing only 1% of the
pre-independence elect~rate.~'However, after it expired, a new, highly restrictive law was
7?

enacted addressing those few persons not having taken advantage of the earlier liberal law.
Foreign nationals and stateless may be naturalized if they: 1) pass a language test; 2) have ten
years' residency; 3) have a legal source of income; 4) pass a basic test on the constitution; and 5)

have no nationality presently or will automatically lose it upon acceptance of ~ i t h u a n i a ' s . ~ ~
Naturalization will be denied to those who: 1) committed genocide or crimes against
humanity; 2) were sentenced to imprisonment for an act Lithuania considers to be a crime; 3) are
chronic alcoholics or drug addicts; and 4) are ill with especially dangerous infectious diseases.89
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See id. at 236.
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These last two are particularly interesting, since the alcoholics, addicts and ill, who otherwise
meet the requirements for
have.-.>
already
been permanent residents for at least ten
.
-- - naturalization,
. *-. .
.

years, may be members of families already naturalized, and may have become subject to those
problems in the territory of Lithuania. Thus, they are already a burden to the state in some form
and are equated for purposes of denial of citizenship with criminals and war criminals. The

policy seems to this author to be non-synchronous with Lithuania's otherwise liberal stance.
Lithuania also has a progressive law outlining the rights and duties of citizens who are
ethnic minorities?'

The Russian Federation Point of View
The issue of ethnic Russian minority in the Baltics, in particular Latvia and Estonia, has
been one of the major sources of contention between the Russian Federation and the Baltic
States. The Russian Federation denounced Estonia's citizenship and alien laws as a violation of
human rights law and compared the policy to "apartheid and racism" since the laws prohibit noncitizens to vote or to own land.9i Russian-Latvian relations have suffered similarly over the issue
as

Former Soviet Union. For most of its history, the Soviet Union took an exclusively

dualist approach to the incorporation of international law and its domestic law. Soviet legislation

"See id. 262; ~h~p://www.homeoffice.gov.uklind~lit4.htm#minority~
(Law and National Minorities of the
Republic of Lithuania: guarantees to all its citizens, regardless of their ethnicity, equal political, economic and
social rights and freedoms; recognizes its citizens' ethnic identity and the continuity of their culture; respects every
ethnic minority and language; discrimination with regard to race, ethnicity or nationality, language or anything else
related to ethnicity is prohibited and punished; right to obtain aid from the State to develop minority culture and
education; cultural organizations of ethnic minorities have the right to establish cultural and educational institutions;
right to schooling in one's native language, with provision for faculties at institutions of higher learning to train
teachers needed by ethnic minorities; right to have the press in one's native language; right to form ethnic cultural
organizations; historical and culrural monuments of ethnic minorities have to be considered part of the cultural
heritage of Lithuania; every citizen, upon obtaining a passport, is free to identi@ his national origin on the basis of
his parents or one of his parents or to ask the authorities not to insert a "nationaIityWseal into herlhis passport.)
9'

See id. at 269.

92 See

id at 269.

determined which of its domestic laws were to be subject to international taw and, further,
sole source
-.
of the domestic provision, to take precedence
whether international law was to be the
. +

--I

over stated domestic sources, or to be on a par with domestic sources. Moreover, included
sources of international law rarely included customary norms. Distrust of Western capitalism,
suspicion of Euro-centric mores influencing customary international laws and the isolationist
attitude of Soviet foreign policy resulted in a practice of sanctioning customary norms on only an
exceptional basis and recognizing only that intemational law in treaties to which the USSR was a
party. Thus, Soviet domestic policy was marked by a dominant attitude of separation from the

international community?3

During Brezhnev's regime, the Soviet Union became more active in international
attempts to codify customary law. In addition, its 1977 Constitution included a provision
promising f?ulfillment of obligations arising from both customary international law and treaties.
r--\

However, while Soviet officials vaunted these activities, they made little effort to actually
incorporate them in Soviet domestic law and declined to provide guarantees that domestic Iaw
would comport with international norms or that foreign policy. decisions would be based on
intemational law, viewing compliance with international norms as primarily voluntary,
particularly in the area of human rights.94
Gorbachev, however, attempted to set a national policy to elevate the status of
international law in domestic affairs. He recognized the political importance of ending the
Soviet Union's separatist stance in relation to the international community and promulgated a
compulsory attitude toward participation in international law, assigning top priority to bringing
domestic legislation pertaining to human rights into compliance.
See GTNSBURGS,
supra note 86, at 1-7.

''See id, at 6-7.

In addition, his Foreign

Minister, Shevardnadze, extended this mandate to internationd law norms generally and engaged
,[-.

the country in a surge of international
diplomatic
initiatives.
Again, however, old habits die
.
.
.
-

.

-.

hard, and actual domestic implementation of the new priority fell dramatically short of official
promises.95

Marking the priority given to compliance with international human rights law, in 1991
the Soviet Union signed on to the Optional Protocol of the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights, recognizing the authority of the Committee on Human Rights to accept
individual petitions against it, showing "a revolutionary break with precedent".96 In addition, it
loosened further its hold on its sovereignty by declaring recognition of the competence of the
Committee on Human Rights under Article 41 of that Covenant (allowing state petitions between
states having made such declaration), of the Committee for the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination under Article 14 of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
r-->

of Racial Discrimination (allowing state petitions), and of the Committee against Torture under
Articles 21 and 22 of the Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment (allowing state and individual petitions).97 On the other hand,
however, domestic legislation and the Soviet Constitution failed to be revised regarding basic
rights established in the conventions, for example, immigration and emigration procedures.98
However, the Soviet Union continued to include reference to international law, primarily
conventional, in certain of its legislation99 until the attempted military coup to overthrow
Gorbachev in August 1991. Although the coup was thwarted, out of the chaos of that event,
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leadership passed from Gorbachev to Yeltsin and the Soviet Union dissolved itself on September

_

5, 1991, but not before.passing the Declaration
.
. . __.. of the
.
Rights and Freedoms of the Individual,
-.

which stated:
Every person possesses natural, inalienable, and inviolable rights and freedoms.
They are consecrated in the laws which must conform to the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the International covenants on human rights, other
international nonns and the present ~ e c l a r a t i o n . ' ~ ~
Interestingly, in April 1990, well before its dissolution, the USSR passed a Law on the
Procedure of Deciding Questions Connected with the Exit of a Union Republic fiom the USSR.
Its citizenship provisions continued the USSR's new incorporational attitude toward international
law and stated:
ArticIe 15. Citizens of the USSR on the territory of the exiting republic are
afforded the right of choice of citizenship, place of residence and employment.
The exiting republic compensates all expenses connected with the resettlement of
citizens outside the confines of the republic.
Article 16. In accordance with the generally recognized principles and
norms of international law and the international obligations of the USSR, the
exiting republic guarantees the civil, political, social, economic, cuItural and other
rights and freedoms of citizens of the USSR who remain to reside on its territory
without any discrimination whatever on grounds of race, color of skin, gender,
language, religion, political or other convictions, national or social origin,
property status, place and time of birth.'''

Of course, this Soviet law was disregarded by the exiting Baltic Republics as incompatible with
their theory of legal continuation of a previously existing state and their view that their
occupation by the Soviet Union was illegal in the first instance, and thus Soviet law could not
establish a legal regime in the renewed independent states.
Russian Federation. Upon the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Russian Soviet
Federative Socialist Republic (the Russian Federation or RSFSR), now fully sovereign and

loo

~ dat. 47.
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Id. at 147.

,?
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independent, continued and increased the trend to receive international law into its domestic law,
n
. .
-.law. I. t adopted the Declaration of the Rights and
resulting in a monist approach to international-

.

Freedoms of the Individual and citizen, which stated:

...

universally recognized international norms relating to human rights have
precedence over the laws of the Russian Federation and directly engender rights
and duties for citizens of the Russian ~ederati0n.l'~
Furthermore, this paragraph was included verbatim in the Constitution of the Russian Federation
when it was amended in 1992. The Declaration also granted legal non-citizens largely the same
rights and freedoms as well as duties as citizens.lo3
Although the clause above gives primacy of international law over domestic law, many of
the laws promulgated have included a reference also stating that primacy.

Interestingly,

however, the laws that are written in this manner have limited international application, for
example, regarding domestic agriculture and husbandry, while laws that do have an international
component, for example, dealing with political asylum, communications, contributions of
~ addition, the
personnel to peace-keeping operations, usually skip the prima~yl a n g ~ a g e . ' In
Russian Federation law-malung bodies have not comported with international Iaw due to an
apparent lack of expertise."'
Regarding nationality, the Russian Federation, as the self-nominated natural heir to the
USSR in many ways,lo6 continued its liberal attitude as set out in its 1990 Exit of a Union
Republic Law toward the residents of its territory in enactment of its own Law on Citizenship in

1991. This law provided for the "zero-option" method: Russian citizenship was automatically
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accorded to all citizens of the former USSR residing in the territory of the RSFSR, unless within
one year they demonstraJed their desire
. not.to
take
_.- Russian citizenship.lo7
_.
.

However, Russia's historical dificuIty in implementing the international components of
its laws manifested again, which difficulty has resulted in denial of citizenship to many ethnic
Russians abroad, as well as to other ethnic minorities on Russian soil. For one thing, the RSFSR
interpreted "residing on the territory" to apply to those who had a permanent residency permit as
of February 6, 1992, which narrowed the category. It left out recent immigrants from other
Soviet regions who had not yet achieved formal registration as legal residents, including those
who had been compelled to leave their prior domicile. Many in this category received the status
of refugees.'08 The numbers are not insignificant, with a heavy influx during the late 1980s and
early 1990s. One source offers 929,000 migrants from the "near abroad" (former Soviet
republics outside of the RSFSR) in 1992 and 923,000 in 1993, with 324,000 of the latter
characterized as forced migrants, including refugees.'0g
In addition, the authors of the law ignored the Red Army units, which the RSFSR
inherited from the USSR, stationed outside the Russian Federation on the temtories of the
successor republics.' lo As we have seen, Latvia and Estonia specifically exclude this category of
residents from eligibility for citizenship, unless they were prior Latvians or Estonians, resulting
in statelessness for these persons and their families. This was not corrected until 1993 when the
Russian Supreme Soviet passed a resolution including them in the Law on ~itizenshi~."'

'''See id.at 152.
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Another difficulty could arise because the application for Russian citizenship required an
termination
of the. prior citizenship.'I2 A person could be
appended document confirming
- -- .
,

rendered stateless if the Russian application is denied and the prior citizenship has already been
terminated.
In the territories of the near abroad republics, the Russian Federation portrayed itself as
home to Soviet citizens who desired a citizenship tie with it and thus legislated a simplified
registration process at sites abroad at which the Soviet citizens could declare such a desire within
three years (by 1995), provided they had not accepted other citizenship. In lock step with other
Russian legislative implementation, however, those who wished to avail themselves of this
citizenship found no mechanism in pIace to facilitate it. Only 60,000 people out of the 25-30
million ethnic Russians in the near abroad republics obtained Russian citizenship by the end of
1993 due to lack of the intended local offices. Some estimates show that in Estonia 100,000f-1

200,000 people indicated a desire to obtain Russian citizenship had they not been stranded
without recording outlets.' l3
Effects of Baltic and Russian Nationality Laws on Statelessness

There are a morass of problems that have resulted from the narrow naturalization
requirements of language proficiency and additional years of residency after 1990 in the Baltic
Republics combined with Russian and Baltic administrative problems and political sensitivities,
As discussed supra, Lithuania's early liberal naturalization policy resulted in 90% of nonindigenous permanent residents to obtain Lithuanian naturalization. Thus, Lithuanian Russian
minorities escaped most of the probIerns experienced by Estonian and Latvian Russian
minorities.
'I2 see id. at
'I3

157.

See id. at 157-159.

Estonia. The situation in Estonia is illustrative. Russian policies allowed former USSR

-.
.

.' .

citizens to.register for Russian
- nationality
_ but-it
_ . must
. occur within three years, while Estonia's
exclusionary policy forced the non-indigenous population to find other citizenship or face
statelessness. However, the Russian embassy was reluctant to grant ethnic Russians citizenship
for fear of opening an exodus to Russia.

The time came, however, that processing of

applications could be delayed no longer, since the Russian Federation citizenship deadline was
approaching. Thus, in 1994 and 1995, the Russian embassy in Estonia processed 80,000"~
passports. Estonia's government interpreted this activity as a demonstration of the Russian
Federation's goal to establish "a Russian state within the Estonian

As George

Ginsburgs, author of From Soviet to Russian International Law: Studies in Confinuity and
Change, points out, however, these unfavored people had no other option under the

circumstances short of leaving en masse. As it was, as of early 1995, nearly 400,000 people
L,

were still in "legal limbo" as to whether they would become permanently state1e~s.l'~
Ethnic Russians in Estonia had no good options in the first instance. Effectively denied

citizensbp in Estonia, where they had lived for decades or all their lives and had built up genuine
and effective links to the Republic, it was not desirable to uproot and return to Russia, where
they had Iost their original links. Nor is it desirable to take Russian citizenship and stay in
Estonia where non-citizens cannot own land and are subject to reduced rights. Consequently,
ethnic Russians, originally settled there subject to Soviet "whim" and possibly against their own
wills, were again victim to a system forcing them to choose between leaving the country of their

'I4 See
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effective links, staying with second class status, or staying with no status, no rights and no
protection.

-

-

%

-

.

In 1995, Estonia was brought before the UN Committee on Human Rights which gave it
a negative assessment noting that a substantial portion of the population was unable to gain
Estonian citizenship due to "an excess of criteria set by law, strict requirements for language
fluency, as well as lack of opportunity to contest administrative decrees denying
naturalization.""'

In addition, it denounced Estonia for recognizing as national minorities only

those holding Estonian citizenship, barring holders of permanent residency permits from full
participation in national minority organizations. Furthermore, the State Duma of the Russian
Federation called for economic sanctions against Estonia for political, legal, social and economic
discrimination.' I g
Latvia. Latvia has also carried out an exclusionary policy with a similar interface with
the Russian citizenship law, and similar results. For example, in 1995, under Latvia's new
citizenship law, 120,000 of the 660,000 non-citizens applied for citizenship. Approximately
116,000 were disqualified due to a g e n o one was accepted over the age of 65-r

failure to

pass the exams in Latvian. Of the 3,787 people who were not disqualified, 2,361 submitted new
applications, but only 810 actually received citizenship. Given the incredibly poor odds of
success, 15-17% of the total population of Latvia moved to the Russian Federation by earIy
1996. The remaining non-Latvian populations remain stateless.

However, populace-wide

problems often are "solved" by the populace; the black-market is flourishing where Latvian

passports go for $650-700 US, as compared to $25 US for a Russian passport at the Russian
embassy.
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Status of Compliance with International Law

Lithuania

Despite
- - not being
a , signatory. of the Convention on the Reduction of
. *-

Statelessness of 1961, Lithuania comes closest of all the Baltic States to fidfilIing the goal of that
treaty. As discussed supra, 90% of non-indigenous non-citizens requested and were granted
citizenship under Lithuania's early naturalization law. The remaining 10% were subject to a
quite restrictive law which precluded anyone sentenced to imprisonment, chronic alcoholics and
drug addicts, and anyone ill with especially dangerous infectious diseases. This last policy
derogates from the goals of the treaty. Certainly, it would seem that Lithuania essentially fulfills

the customary norm that everyone has a right to a nationality and the Universal Declaration's
proscription of discrimination.

Latvia. It is interesting to note that Latvia is the only one of the Baltic States that is a
signatory to the Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness of 1961. As described above, the
7

Convention obliges a state party to "grant its nationality to a person born in its territory who
would otherwise be stateless" (Article 1) and to grant nationality to a person not born in its
territory, but has a parent who has nationality, if the person would otherwise be stateless (Article
4). It is fair to say that, to the extent that ethnic Russians would be unable to obtain Russian
citizenship, Latvia would be in violation of its obligations under that treaty.
It may also be pointed out that ethnic Russians outside the Russian Republic held Soviet
citizenship, but generally were not Russian citizens under Soviet law.]l9 Although the Russian
Federation is considered heir to the USSR in many respects,

is not considered a continuation of

the USSR for purposes of nationality, and thus may not simply confer its ,nationality on the

'I9 See Richard C . Visek, Creating The Ethnic Electorate Through Legal Restorationism: Ci~izenshipRighrs In
Estonia, 38 HARV.
I N T I L.J. 3 15,352 (1 997).

nationals of other states without their consent.'20 Ethnic heritage or descent, in the absence of
other links, arguably are
not strong enough
effective
links to overcome those of persons who
.
.
.I
.
.

/

were born and reside in Latvia and call it their home. Thus, it could be argued that, under the
concept of effective nationality, other states would be under no obligation to recognize attempts
to justify imposition of Russian nationality on the ethnic Russians of

atv via.'^'

Estonia. Estonia, on the other hand, is not party to the Convention and thus is bound

only by customary international law.

'

As described above, although the broad right to a

nationality can be identified, prohibition of a state .to allow statelessness to occur is still
aspirational under customary international law. Thus, Estonia's policies cannot be considered
explicitly illegal. However, it is subject to the same effective nationality argument that Latvia is.
Perhaps due to the effective nationality concept and the United Nations' increasing tendency
toward recognition of the obligation of states to prevent statelessness, as discussed above, it is
under international pressure, from Russia and the United Nations, to solve its statelessness

problem.
Conclusion

The Baltic States situation demonstrates a type of statelessness that results from the
disappearance of the state of origin, leaving ethnic minorities in the territory of successor states,
which states establish policies biased toward their indigenous population. The three states have
established varying policies regarding naturalization of stateless members of ethnic minorities.

Lithuania has established extremely liberal naturalization laws, in effect recognizing genuine and
effective links of the ethnic minorities. However, in the particular cases of Latvia and Estonia,
naturalization policies are born from resentment of the ethnic minorities, who are associated with
See id. at 352-353.
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a prior aggressor state that attempted to replace their languages and cultures. Perhaps it could be
7

said that these countries.wish
- . to deny the existence of geniine and effective links.
. - . .
*

C
_
.I

-.

The United Nations' approach to the problem has been to recognize Russian citizenship
when an individual has chosen it, but takes the position, in this case, that the ethnic minorities
should be naturalized by the state of permanent residence and has thus condemned the
inflexibility in Latvia's and Estonia's naturalization laws. Thus, it continues to exert pressure on
them to eliminate the condition of statelessness among their inhabitants.
The Palestinians

Twentieth Century History of Palestine

Prior to World War I, the area known as Palestine was ruled by the Ottoman Empire and
identified with the larger Arab region. Palestinians were descended fkom the ancient Canaanites,
who for as long as recorded history constituted the majority population of the region.122 They
.-,---

were primarily agricultural, and thus stationary, in contrast to other Arab groups who were
nomadic. After World War I, Western powers split up the Ottoman Empire and assigned a
number of areas under the new League of Nations mandate system, a system of trust oversight by
Western powers of less developed areas until the areas could operate independently. Palestine
was considered to be an "A" Mandate, by which was meant that it was categorized as a

community developed enough to deserve provisional recognition as an independent nation,
subject to administrative advice to be given by a Mandatory state (supervising state) until it was
able to stand on its own.'23
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'23 Omar M . Dajani, ~ t u i l e d
~ e t w e e hSeasons: The InfernarionalLegal Status Of Palestine During The Interim
Period, 26 DENV.J. INPLL.& POL'Y27,33-34 (1997).

However, in contradiction to the terms of the League of Nations Covenant establishing
the terns of handling

-..
League
.
of Nations assigned Great Britain as
an "A" Mandate country,.the
-

.

.

.

Palestine's Mandatory without Patestine's consent. In addition, the Mandate submitted by Great
Britain and approved by the League of Nations Council established a mandate control level
appropriate for a less developed community. Furthermore, the Mandate incorporated terms of
the Balfour ~ e c l a r a t i o nand
' ~ ~ thus included the goal of establishing a "Jewish national home"

within the territory of ~ a 1 e s t i n e . l This
~ ~ goal was to be facilitated by "placing the country under

such political, administrative and economic conditions as will secure the establishment of the
Jewish national home" and establishing terms for the creation of a Jewish agency "to assist and

take part in the development of the countryrr .126
In 1922, the population of Palestine consisted of 90% indigenous Arabs and the
remainder Christians and ~ e w s . ' ~ ' The Mandate originally contemplated the eventual
establishment of a single state with a single nationality law providing for acquisition of
citizenship by Jews who took up residence in ~alestine.'~' However, the British Mandatory
Government also established liberal Jewish immigration policies in support of its commitment to
creation of a Jewish national home.129 Under this program, by 1947, the Jewish population

'"

The Balfour Declaration was a letter issued during World War I by British foreign secretary Arthur James
Balfour, expressing the British government's approval of Zionism with "the establishment in Palestine of a national
home for the Jewish people." The immediate purpose was to win support for the Allied cause of Jews and others in
the warring nations and neutral countries, such as the United States. See Encarta Online Concise Encyclopedia,
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constituted 30% of the Palestinian popu1ation.'30 This rapid growth and the policies supporting it
,-'

aroused resentment in tlje indigenous. Pale,dinians
_.
_-.who identified with the broader Arab nation
.

and feared coming under the rule of European ~ ~ i g r a n t s . ' 3 1

By 1937, with ten years left before the Mandate expired, tensions had become
increasingly violent and Britain recognized that the conflict was "irrepressible".

Thus, it

recommended partitioning the country into separate Jewish and Arab states, incorporating the
latter into Transjordan. This inflamed emotions of both Zionists and Arabs, the Zionists feeling
that the territory allotted them was too small, the Arabs objecting to Britain's right to break up
the country at all. Britain abandoned the idea, declaring its goal for an "independent Palestine

state" within ten years. However, relations between the Arabs and the Zionists continued to
deteriorate.132

In 1947, Britain returned the Mandate to the United Nations, acknowledging it could not
'---,

impose a settlement in Palestine. The United Nations recommended partition into three sections

-Arab,

Jewish and an "international enclave" surrounding Jerusalem-to

come into effect two

months after withdrawal of Britain's armed forces.'33 Although Palestinian Arabs and many
Zionists rejected the plan, the United Nations General Assembly nevertheless endorsed it. 134
Upon the British exit, the Zionists established control over the territory allocated them by
the United Nations plan, as well as some allocated to the Arab state. On May 14, 1948, they

declared the establishment of the State of Israel. After its independence, it took over more of the
Arab allotment. By the time armistice was established, Israel's official boundaries included 80%
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L COMP.L. REV.22 1,225 (1 99 1).
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See Dajani, supra note 123, at 37-38.
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See id. at 38.
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See id. at 38-39.
See id. at 39.

of ~ a l e s t i n e ,the
' ~ ~West Bank and Gaza remaining under Arab control,'36 less than the United
f--'
-. these
. last areas in 1967 and continues to do so
Nations' recommendation.
- - -Israel then occupied
.
..

'

today. 37

Statelessness of Palestinians
Prior to 1948, the Palestinian Arab population of the area that came to be Israel was
900,000. During the hostilities of that takeover, 85% of that population, or about three-quarters
of a million, became refugees in other states,13' 300,000 of which having already departed by the
day of the declaration of independence.'39 During the 1967 hostilities, 350,000 Palestinians,

approximately one-quarter of the population of West Bank and Gaza, fled these areas into
neighboring states.140 Israel has never permitted these individuals or their descendants to. return,
nor are they allowed citizenship in Israel, thus the majority of them are stateless.
The reasons for departure have been c ~ n t e s t e d . ' ~The
' Arab view is that, in 1948, the
Zionists forced them out with violent attacks and bombings, "terrorism, repression and forcible
ejection," as well as by "psychological warfare," frightening them out by intimidation,
whispering campaigns and false rumors of cholera and typhus outbreaks in Arab areas.'42 The
Israeli view has traditionally been that the Arabs organized themselves and left voluntarily as
part of Arab war plans.143 However, with the recent committed approach to achieving peace in

13'

See id

13'

See John Quigley, Displaced Paleslinim And A Right Of Return, 39 HARV.INT'L L.J. 171, 173 (1 998).

13'

See id at 173.
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See Quigley, supra note 130, at 225.

'39
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See Quigley, supra note 136, at 177.
See id. at 18 1.
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For a poignant dialogue demonstrating this contested viewpoint, see Ved Nanda, et al., Self-Deierminafion: The
Case of Palestine, 82 AM.SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC.334, 335-337,339-34 I , 34 1-343 ( I 988).
142

Quigley, supra note 136, at 179-1 80.
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See Quigley, supra note 130, at 229.

the Middle East, Israel has embraced a new history to teach its children more in line with the
7

Arab view:'"

Expulsiops continued into the _
e-xly1950s with Israel trucking Palestinians to the
-.

border and forcing them to cross it.14' Israel also denies causing the 1967 exodus; however, the

U.S. State Department documents that Israeli air strikes hit "many" civilian targets on the West

Bank despite there being no military placements there.146
Israeli citizenship laws are focussed on its self-identification as a Jewish state.I4' These
laws underlie further legislation whose purpose is to prohibit the election to the Knesset of any
candidates, or the tabling of any bills, that "reject the existence of the State of Israel as the State
of the Jewish people", to incorporate Jewish religious law into Israeli law,148and to undermine
the economic viability of non-Jewish citize~is.'~~
In 1950, Israel passed the Law of Return,
which gave every Jew worldwide the right to immigrate to Israel. Then in 1952, the Nationality
Law was passed which automatically conferred citizenship on any Jew who settled in Israel.
Palestinian Arabs who were displaced in 1948 could not return because the Nationality Law only
permits acquisition of citizenship by [non-Jewish] persons who proved "continuous residence
from May 14, 1948 to July 14, 1952, or who legally returned during that period, if, in addition,

the person registered as an inhabitant by March 1, 1952."I5O Furthermore, the Israeli government
allowed few Arabs to return legally, taking the stance that the Arabs who departed in 1948 did so

144

See Ethan Bronner, Israel's Histoy Textbooks Replace Wfhs With Facts, The New York Times,August 14,
1999.
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See Quigley, supra note 136, at 184.
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Seeid at 181-182.

I4'See Quigley, supra note 130, at 226.
14'

See id. at 227.

'49Seeid at221-251.
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Id at 228-229.

'--'-.

because they were working against 1srael.15' Moreover, citizenship was denied for many Arabs
could
not prove _residency
to the satisfaction of authorities, leaving
who never left because .they
- _ .
.
_..

these persons and their children stateless. 152
- '

Under pressure from the United Nations, Israel revised its Nationality Law in 1968
granting citizenship to stateless children who applied between the ages of 18 and 2 1 and had not
been convicted of a security offense or sentenced to a term longer than five years
In 1980, it was amended again to eliminate the requirement for residency
between 1948 and 1952 for residents of Israel and granted them citizenship if they were citizens
of Palestine at the time Israel was established, although still excluding any Palestinians who were
permanent residents of Palestine at the time or who lacked sufficient proof of citizenship. Thus, a
majority of Palestinians residing within the bounds of Israel have gained nationality1" (although
with fewer services and protections than Jewish citizens). No Palestinians residing outside Israel

are deemed to have a right to Israeli citizenship, ostensibly due to, inter alia, security concerns.
The displaced Palestinians went to neighboring countries, taking up residence in refugee

camps or within general communities. Each of these states has taken a different position as to
the presence of the stateless Palestinians, only two of which states have offered citizenship, Iraq

15 1

See id at 229.

152

See id at 229-230.

153

See id. at 230.

'"

Despite acquisition of citizenship, however, distinctions between Jews and non-Jews have remained, dictating
different legal routes for acquisition of citizenship. See id. Jewish citizens and Arab citizens have distinctly
different services and protections, with Jewish citizens being eligible for more beneficial land-ownenhip schemes,
banking privileges, and social welfare benefits than Arab citizens. See id,at 221-251. Professor Quigley describes
this situation as apartheid. In addition, Arabs comprise only 17% of the electorate, which includes the 100,000
Arabs of East Jerusalem, most of whom do not vote because of refusal to recognize Israel's jurisdiction over this
area. See id., at 239. However, these discrepancies are beyond the scope of this paper.

(who offers citizenship to any Arabs who apply) and Jordan (to residents of West Bank and
,'

~ a z a ) , ' ~and
' thus the qajonty of these
. -.refugees
-. and their children remain stateless.
-.

However, Jordan's grant of citizenship has since been r e ~ 0 k e d . l ~In~ 1954, Jordan
granted citizenship to those Palestinians who were residents of the West Bank and Palestinians
already within the borders of the rest of Jordan, as a result of its 1950 annexation of the West

~ a n k . ' ~Palestinians
'
holding citizenship enjoy the same rights as all other Jordanians, but noncitizen Palestinians, including those from Gaza who fled during the 1967 war, are not allowed to
vote, hold public-sector jobs,'58 or own

However, they are issued two-year passports

to enable them t r a ~ e l . ' ~
However, Jordan's parliament specified that the annexation would "in no way be
connected with the finaI settlement of Palestine's just cause," i.e., the hture emergence of a
Palestinian state. Thus, it is viewed that the Palestinians were "only provisionally placed under
Jordanian sovereignty."'6' Jordan followed through on this provisional stance in 1988, when it
renounced its claim to the West Bank in keeping with the decision of the Palestine National
Council, constituted by representatives from Middle Eastern Arab states, to declare a Palestinian
state.'62 Under that renunciation, Jordan narrowed its passport policies and when, in 1995, the

'''See Elia Zureik, "Palestinian Refugees and the Peace Process: Final Status Issues Paper", InstitUte for Palestine
Studies, Washington, DC (1996) <ww.ipsjps.orglhtmVrureik.htm>.
See id.

'" See Quigley, supra note 136, at 2 17; and see Henry J . Richardson, et al., Rights ofSe~Deerminationofpeoples
in EstablishedStates: Southern Afiica and the M i d d e East, 85
158

AM.SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC.54 1, 549 (1 991).

See U . S . Committee for Refugees, USCR: Country Report: Jordan <http://www.refbgees.org~world/coun~t~
mideastljordan.htm>.
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See Zureik, supra note 155.
See USCR, supra note 1 58.
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Quigley, supra note 136, at 2 16-217.

Ib2

see id. at 2 17.
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West Bank and Gaza began issuing Palestinian passports, Jordan revoked its passports from
Palestinians who moved to the sel f-rule areas.
16"
.
-

.

.

I
.
-

As an example of the magnitude of the Palestinian plight, at the end of 1997, the United

Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Rehgees in the Near East (UNRWA)'@ had
1,413,252 Palestinian refugees registered, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees

(UNHCR) had 763, and Jordan estimated an additional 800,000 "displaced persons" residing
within it. (UNRWA does not track how many Palestinian refugees have Jordanian citizenship
because it considers it irrelevant for its mandate.) Palestinian citizens of Jordan are now an
outright majority in Jordan.I6' The money available for the educational and medical services that
UNRWA provides has remained constant despite a growing service population. Since 1993, it
has been in financial crisis. As a result, Jordan has been spending more for such services for the
Palestinians itself, but is concerned that such participation may imply to the international
community an acceptance of the refbgees contrary to its commitment to U.N. Resolution 194

(111), resolving that Palestinians should be returned to their homes.166
Other states, however, have declined to offer citizenship to Palestinians at all and each
demonstrates a different policy toward hosting the Palestinians. Lebanon is the most restrictive,
implementing objectives such as "redistributing" them to other Arab countries; severing links
between rehgee camps; not allowing them to work, thus relegating them to the "informal
economy" where they are exploited through low pay and exempt from unemployment and

welfare benefits; and "refusing to establish a legal and administrative framework ... which

'63 See USCR,

supra note 158.

Established in 1948 by the UN to provide protection and refugee relief services to Palestine refugees, as
discussed further inpa.
See USCR, supra note 158.
See id.

would define

... the status of the Palestinian refugees."167 They are also denied free education

,-,

(however, those eligiblefor UNRWA.receiye i t b o u g h that agency until grade nine).'"

In Syria, conditions for Palestinians are more favorable. They enjoy equal access to
government social benefits, education and employment opportunities; however, they lack
political rights. They may own one house, but no arable land and may not participate in
In Egypt and the Gulf Countries, the rights proffered Palestinian refugees have ebbed
and waned since the 1948 exodus, with earlier periods of good employment, liberal travel
allowance, and access to public services and later periods with many of those rights and benefits
re~cinded."~Libya accorded Palestinians good access to work, but in 1995 abruptly changed its
policies and expelled a significant portion of that population. Expellees were mostly turned
away from other Arab countries and the West Bank and Gaza and now live in refugee camps
along the Libyan-Egyptian border."'

In the North Afiican countries of Morocco, Tunisia and
--\

Algeria, all signatories to the 1951 Convention on the Status of Refugees, Palestinians are well

incorporated into their economies. Agreements between the PLO and the governments regulate
their presence, and permits are coordinated between the PLO and the host government.
However, Palestinian populations in these countries are small.

'

72

United Nations Position

After the May 1948 declaration of the State of Israel, the United Nations General
Assembly passed Resolution No. I94 (111) of 11 December 1948 in which it established a

'61

Zureik, supra note 155.

168

See id.
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see id.

Im
171

See id.
See id

In See id.

Conciliation Commission constituted of representatives of Turkey, France and the United
Assembly's
position that those Palestinian refugees
states.'73 The resolution stated the General
.
. .
.
-

.

I
.
.

who desired it should be restored t o their homes and that compensation should be paid for
damage and property lost and to those refugees who did wish to return.'"

It also established the

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA) to
provide protection and refugee relief services to "Palestine refugees" and their descendents, who
are defined as "any person whose normal place of residence was Palestine during the period 1
June 1946 to 15 May 1948 and who lost both his home and means of livelihood as a result of the

1948 ~ o n f l i c t . " ' ~ ~
There are also many Palestinians who do not fall into that definition of Palestine refbgees
but who are nonetheless without Israeli or Palestinian residence or nationality. In addition are
those displaced by the 1948 war who:
went to states not included in UNRWA's territorial jurisdiction, such as the Gulf States
and North Affica;
were internally displaced but whose situation has not been resolved by Israel;
were outside the British Mandatory Palestine when the war broke out and were not
permitted to return;
sought refuge in 1948 but did not register with UNRWA due to pride.
Other displaced Palestinians are those who subsequently left Israel to study, work, visit relatives,
etc., and were not permitted to return once their Israeli-issued residency permits expired (known

as "latecomers"), and those who fled or were absent from West Bank and Gaza when the 1967

Res. 194 (III),Preamble, U.N.Doc. A18 10, at 2 (1948).

"3

See G.A.

L 74

Seeid., 7 11, at24.

'" Zureik, supra note 155.

war broke out or who were subsequently deported from those territories. Thus, the United

-

I

,

_..in advocacy for these ~ a t e ~ 0 r i e s . l ' ~
Nations High Comrnissioner
- - for Refugees
. -. is involved

Subsequent to the Six Day War in 1967, the United Nations took a stronger stance on

behalf of the Palestinian stalemate. In a series of resolutions beginning in 1969, the United
Nations has progressed fkom its position affirming repatriation of refugees to a declaration
recognizing Palestinian Arabs as a "people ~r,177 applying to them the appeIlation "the
~alestinians"'~~
and recognizing the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) as their
representative.179 Further, the resolutions explicitly &rm

that the Palestinians have a right to

self-determinati~n'~~
and recognition, by both the General Assembly and the Security Counci.1,
that Israel is belligerently occupying foreign territories with regard to the Occupied Palestinian
Territories (OPT).Is'

The Oslo accords, the series of agreements between Israel and the PLO in 1993, 1995 and
-\

1997, were intended to begin peaceful negotiation of the status of the West

Bank and ~ a z a . ' ~ '

They brought into being the Palestinian Authority (PA), recognized as the interim Palestinian

See id

Dajani, supra note 123, at 42, citing G.A. Res. 2535 (XXIV), U.N. GAOR, 24" Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 25, U.N.
Doc. A/7630 ( I 970).
17*

Id., citing G.A. Res. 2628 (XXV),U.N. GAOR,25' Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 5, U,N. Doc. N8028 (1970).

See id. at 43, citing G.A. Res. 32 10 (XXIX), U.N. GAOR, 29' Sess., Supp. No. 3 1 , at 3, U.N. Doc. A/963 1
(1 974).

Ia0Seeid., citing G.A. Res 2649 (XXV),U.N. GAOR, 25" Sess., Supp. No. 28, at 73-74, U.N. Doc. N8028 (1970).
181

See id.at 46, citing, e.g., G.A. Res. 49/62D, U.N. GAOR, 49" Sess. ( 1994); G.A. Res. 2443 (XXIII), U.N.
GAOR, 23&Sess. (1968); S.C.Res. 446, U.N.SCOR, 34' Sess., at 4, U.N.Doc. SJMFl35 (1979); G.A.Res.
48/41B, U.N. GAOR, 4~~ Sess., Supp. No. 49, at 114, U.N. Doc. A148/49 (1993).
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See id at 60-6 1.

self-governing authority for portions of the OPT.^^) However. the accords make no provision for
repatriation of the Palestinian
refugees.
:

.

--...

..

Israel's Level of Compliance with ~nternationalLaw

The arguments in favor of the Palestinians' right to return take two compatible forms:
first, is the "right of return", i.e., they have a right to be repatriated to their former homes,
wherever located within the bounds of the State of Israel or the Occupied Palestinian Territories
(OPT); and second, the right to self-determination within the OPT. John Quigley, Professor of
Law at Ohio State University, has provided an excellent analysis of Palestinians as nationals of
Palestine with a right of return, irrespective of whether their exodus was voluntary or coerced,
under international law, human rights law and humanitarian law.'85 This includes answering
Israel's challenges to the assertions of its obligations to repatriate, and an analysis of the legal
consequences of coerced departure.'86
Professor Quigley establishes Palestinians' nationality by pointing out that since World
War I, the international community has insisted that a 1 new states must respect the nationality of

the inhabitants.

This is further supported by the recent work of the International Law

Commission, as discussed supra, which stated that a new state must extend its nationality to the
inhabitants. This position is supported by customary international law, also as discussed supra.
Professor Quigley then extends this princip!e to a mandate territory, stating that there is no
difference regarding nationality despite the factual difference. Inhabitants of a mandatory
territory are not stateless; although the sovereignty of the territory is "in abeyance7', the
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See id.

184

See Quigley, supra note 122, at 288.

1B5

See, generally, QuigIey ,supra note 136.

186

See id.

community is still a "subject of international law" as a beneficiary of the mandatory trust
/7

anangement.la7 That Britain and the League
-.
_ ofNations
-.recognized this is clear: the inhabitants
.,.

of mandate territories were not considered nationals of the mandatory governments, which

governments recognized a mandate nationality in concordance with the mandate goal of political
independence.lag In this case, Britain created a Palestine nationality, issuing Palestinian
passports.189 Furthermore, state practice suggests that the "inference of nationality applies to all
who carry the natibnalit-y of the prior state, regardless of their where-abouts on the date of
transfer of sovereignty."lgO
International law admits of an obligation of a state to honor a right of return for displaced
On the state-tonationals, both on the state-to-state level and on the state-to-individual ~.evel.l~'
state level, a host state is under no obligation to receive another state's nationals. Indeed if a
state refises to re-admit its own national, the host state's rights may be violated, since it is
-?

entitled to control alien residence in its territory.'92 On the state-to-individual level, under
human rights law, an individual has a right of return, regardless of a waiver by the host state.
This is established, inter alia, by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Art. 13(2)),Ig3the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Art. 12(4))lg4 and the International

Id. at 208-209.
Ia8

See id.
See id. at 209.

I w ~ d . at210.
19'

See id. at 194.

'" See id.
193 See

Universal Declaration, supra note 30, art. 13(2).

lP4
See

CPR Covenant, supra note 3 1, at 176.

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Art. 5(d)(ii)).'9"srael
a party to both

convention^.'^^
- .

.

.

.

-..

is

.

In addition, the United Nations considers Israel's occupation of the OPT to be belligerent,

as discussed supra, and thus humanitarian law guarantees a right of repatriation of those entitled
to it.'" Professor Quigley points out that the Hague ~ e ~ u l a t i o non
s 'the
~ ~law of war require an
occupying state to respect and maintain "public life" in the occupied state, which would require
the participants of that public to be

In addition, the 1949 Geneva Convention

pertaining to civilians requires a belligerent occupant to ensure the rights of "protected persons",
defined as those who at any time and under any circumstances "find themselves ... in the hands
of a[n]

... Occupying Power

of which they are not nationals" even if they are temporarily

absentm200
However, it is argued that Israel's obligation to the Palestinians' right of return are
limited in a number of ways. Professor Quigley addresses six of these proposed limitations, each
of which he disputes:
1)

Return of displaced Palestinians would be a security threat to Israel. Some

commentators interpret Article 29(21201of the Universal Declaration to permit suspension of
195

See International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (openedfir signature
Mar. 7, 1966, entered intoforce Jan. 4 , 1969), art. S(d)(ii), 660 U.N.T.S.195,220.
'%

See Quigley, supra note 136, at 196.

I9'See id at 197.
'98 See Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Oct. 18, 1907, Annex: Regulations
Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, 36 Stat. 2277,2295.

'"

See id. at 197-198.

Id at 198; Convention Relative to the Treatment of Civilian Persons in Time of War (openedfor signature Aug.
12, 1949, entered intoforce Oct. 2 1, 1950), art. 6, para. 4, and art. 158, para. 3,75 U.N.T.S. 287,292 and 392.

''In the exercise of his rights and Freedoms, everyone shall be subjecr only to such limitations as are determined
by law solely for the purpose of securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms or others and of

meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the general welfare in a democratic society." Universal
Declaration, supra note 30, art. 29(2).

rights on security

consideration^?^^

However, if it does, the International Covenant on Civil and
,'

-

\

Political Rights only pe-@ts limitation .on the2,ight to enter his own country" (Article 12(4))
..

during a declared emergency (Article 4), rather than due to security con~iderations.~~~
Furthermore, despite any limitations aIlowed by human rights or humanitarian law, the law of
nationality provides its own limits.

Under this law, a host state has no obligation to

accommodate another state with security problems by keeping the other state's nationals.204
2)

Israel is permitted to suspend its obligation under a declared emergency. Israel

has held a declared state of emergency since 1948. Accordingly, it made reservations to its
ratification of the International Covenant explaining its state of emergency and only holding the
option of derogating fkom Article 9 (pertaining to detention and arrest), thus not preserving a
right to derogate from Article 12(4) regarding right of return.20s Thus, if it should ever decide to
make such a declaration, it would have to state why keeping the Palestinians out would be
-2

"'required by the exigencies of the [emergency] situation"', which may prove difficult to

3)

The displaced Palestinians indeed are not nationals. The argument against this,

addressed

states that Palestinians are nationals under customary international law

because the post-World War I international community has insisted that new states respect the

This author reads Article 29(2) more as a justification of "affumative action" policies and the normal justification
for criminal legislation. In other words, the fust part refers to an allowance of the state to infringe on one person's
rights and freedoms only in order to enable recognition of equal rights and freedoms for others who otherwise may
not exercise them. The second part refers to the necessity of limiting exercise of rights and freedoms to the extent
that they impinge on the essential well-being of others, allowing for standard laws such as the prohibition against
murder, etc.
202

Quigley, supra note 136, at 20 1-202.
204

See id. at 202.
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See id. at 204-204.
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Id. at 204.
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See discussion supra, p. 42.

nationality of inhabitants. The argument goes on to say that a mandatory state is no different in
this respect than a sovereign state.
-

4)

.

.-..

.

Internutionul law provides no obligation ro rerurn large displaced populations.

However, while international instruments set out the right of return as an individual right, not a
group or collective right, one cannot argue that a group is not comprised of individuals. Even if
one could, the question remains how one would set a meaninghl limit on how many individuals

are required to cut off their rights as individuals. Furthermore, the instruments do not refer to
isolated individuals and contain no text providing exceptions regarding

Moreover,

state and U.N. political organ practice has had ample experience with group displacements and
has consistently held in favor of group repatriation, 2w one example of several being the Security
CounciI's resolution that South Africa unconditionally repatriate all Namibians in political
exile.210
5)

Israel is not obligated to admit Palestinians who have obtained new nationalities.

However, the only significant granting of citizenship has occurred in Jordan and, as discussed
supra, was as a result of its annexation of the West Bank and was only provisionally granted,
having phased out its nationality in the West ~ank.'" Furthermore, the U.N.'s position as shown
by the mandate for UNRWA is that citizenship is irrelevant, since the U.N. has called for

repatriation, not for re~ettlernent.~'~
6)

Israel may deny return if Arab stafes mistreat their Jewish inhabitants. Under

international law, a state may engage in countermeasures if another state violates its rights.
-

'08

see id.at 21 1-212.

2 0 9 ~ e e iat212-216.
d.
'I0

see id. at 2 15.
See id. at 216-2 17.

"'See discussion, supra.

However, putting aside an analysis of whether Jews are indeed being il I-treated in other states,
7

countermeasures are subject to limitations. .>ey

.may only be directed at the state who is

committing the violation, limiting ~si-ael'sexercise against specific host states, rather than Arab
states as a whole. Countermeasures must be proportional, and thus denying a right of return to
Palestinians may not be commensurate with a violation of Jews' rights in some fashion.
Countermeasures may be taken only in response to a violation that adversely affects the fust
state, thus requiring Israel to sustain the premise that its rights as a state were violated.
Countermeasures may not violate "basic human rights" or peremptory norms, thus requiring
Israel to overcome a genera1 international presumption that right of entry into one's state is
"basic." Thus, if Jews are mistreated in other countries, Israel's blanket denial of the right of
return to the Palestinians-isnot a viable co~ntermeasure.~~~
Furthermore, under the facts of a coerced departure, i.e., expulsion, Israel violates the law

of nationality, human rights law, and humanitarian law. Even if it were to be argued that the
expulsion was not state policy, the state would be responsible on the basis of respondeat

Conclusion

Whereas the Baltics showed a case of statelessness that can be characterized as the
"disappearance" of the state of origin, the PalestinelIsrael situation demonstrates a cause of
statelessness that can be characterized as the "displacement" of the state of origin. In this
situation, an insurgent minority group takes over a majority of the temtory of a state, in this case
a transitional one, resulting in flight of the majority population beyond territorial borders. In this
particular case, since the territory was "between governments" and for other reasons, the larger

2'3

See Quigiey, supra note 136, at 2 17-219.

2'4

See id. at 2 19-223.

.
.

international community tolerated the establishment of a "Jewish homeland" state, which
F-

..

legislated nationality laws
- - inclusive of
. -.any. . Jew
_ _.. in the
.. world and exclusive of residents of the
territory who were Arab. This case is also exacerbated by Israel's later takeover of the
remaining Palestinian territory, which created another wave of flight to neighboring countries.

The United Nations has taken the position since the beginning that the Palestine Arabs who
wished to must be allowed to return. In the face of Israel's 1967 takeover and Paiestinian
perseverance in asserting their right of self-determination, the United Nations took the position
that Israel's occupation was illegal and Palestinians have a right of self-determination. However,
it also maintains that Palestinians have a right of return to their original homes wherever they

-

were in Israel and has pressured Israel to expand its nationality laws to include them. Thus far,
most resident Palestinians have obtained citizenship, but Israel has not granted it to any but a
very few refkgees, leaving the rest stateless.

. -I

One commentator has suggested as a solution granting dual citizenshivPalestinianJordanian, Palestinian-Syrian, etc.-as

a means to "facilitate Palestinians' future right to travel to

and perhaps eventually settle in an independent Palestinian state" without imposing the
"destabilizing and impractical" effects of an immediate, mass r e t ~ r n . ~ " This may have
problems, such as, for instance, Jordan's position that the Arab League bars dual Arab
nationality.216 However, this author can envision a situation that could characterized as an
"emergent nationality." This would be where the PLO joins with the host countries, as it does in
other matters, to create a regime in which Palestinians are given Palestinian nationality via other
states.

,p

Since the Palestine National Council has declared a Palestinian state, rather than

2'5 Donna E. Arzt, "Palestinian Refugees: The Human Dimension of the Middle East Peace Process," printed in
Alison Inafuku, Regional and Global Implications of the Arab-lsrael Peace Process, 89 AM. SOC'Y INT'L L. PROC.
363 (1995).
216

See USCR,supra note 158.

instituting a dud nationality regime, the PLO could "contract" with Council member states to
.*

provide documentation.-as. well, as state protection
- - .until Palestine is able -to do so. Thus, a

7

Palestinian refugee could be granted a nationality of "Palestinian in Jordan" or "Palestinian in
Syria" by the PLO via the host state. This would augment diplomatic recognition of the
Palestinian state and put the refugees on equal footing with host 'state citizens, without
compromising the cause of Palestine or encumbering the host state with additional nationals on a
permanent basis.
111. CONCLUSION

It is difficult to separate the legal stance taken by the United Nations vis-d-vis a particular
group of stateless from the history and cause of the group's statelessness. In the Baltic situation,
the ethnic minorities migrated to a particular Baltic State under citizenship ;dFafederal state that

was later dissolved, leaving them stateless. In the meantime, these minoritie-s have established
.-,'

genuine and effective links to the Baltic State. The situation for the Palestinians can be seen as
opposite. They fled or departed fkom their home state under conditions where the ethnic
minority took power and then denied citizenship to the refugees under the argument that they
were never nationals of the new state.

The genuine and effective links of most of the

Palestinians remain in their state of origin.
In the Baltic situation, the United Nations has exerted pressure on the Baltic States to

naturalize the stateless ethnic Russians residing within the state, supporting the desires of the
stateless individuals. In the Palestinian situation, although the United Nations made efforts
toward naturalization of the refugees by the host states, it did so as a complement to its efiorts to
convince Israel to allow them to return and as a practical measure to connect the stateless to the
most basic of rights.

Its latest efforts have been toward helping to negotiate a separate
-,?
,

Palestinian territory as well as to allow refugees originating from elsewhere in Israel to be
repatriated if they desire it, supporting the desires
-~
-of the stateless individuals.
-

.

What the two situations have in common is consistency of recognition by the

international community via the United Nations that not only does everyone have a "right to

have rights" through a n a t i o n a ~ i t ~ ,but,
~ " effectively, that an individual's nationality should be
determined by his or her genuine links to a particular state. Arguably, these genuine links may
be determined at least in part by subjective priorities and self-identification to the community of
a'particular state, since the Universal Declaration asserts a right to no "arbitrary interference with
[one's]

... family [and]

the right to "leave [one's] country, ... and to r e t ~ r n " ~the
'~;

value that the "family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society and is entitled to

,and the recognition that an individual may have a "community in which alone -the
protection'~220.
free and full development of his personality is possible,,.221 These rights and values can be seen
to embody the concept that at least a part of one's human identity is established according lo
one's family, one's house, and one's personal affinity for a particular community, or in other
words, according to one's "home".

Perhaps it can be viewed that the Universal Declaration, and

increasingly broader international Iaw, recognizes that an integral part of nationality and human
dignity is a subjective identification of nationality through identification of "home".

In this author's view, the first priority of international law must be to ensure that
everyone has a nationality, whether based on his or her effective links or not. Statelessness is an
existence "between worlds" and creates a situation where one's "human rights" are not derived
"'See Universal Declaration, supra note
*I8

~ dart.
, 12.

219

Id., art. 13(2).

220

Id., art. 16(3).
Id., art. 29(1).

30,art. 15(1).

fkom one's status as a human being, but instead do not exist per se since, in practical terms.
rights are,conferred k-ough nationality. ,Mere-- citizens of a particular state generally share

'

.,

,

.-

?
---

A

common abilities to access work and benefits, to exercise their rights, and to ,call upon
protections, the stateless are a subclass alienated fiorn those basic abilities. International law
appears to be stepping over the fulcrum towkd enough of an infringement upon state sovereignty
to obligate states to confer nationality as shown by the Status

onv vent ion,^ the Reduction

~ o n v e n t i o n , 2and
~ ~D d I ~ r t i c l e s . ~ ~ ~
However, in addition, the Twentieth Century has provided new challenges to "being at
home". National affairs affect the common person more than in the past due to increased state
involvement in communities and support of individuals, as well as increased technology to
effectuate state goals. The results are mass relocations, mass de-nationalization, mass flight-in
short, mass evictions, either fiorn home and community or from access to the state's legal
,-?

regime.

Perhaps a reactionary trend has begun that will evolve into a right to determine

nationality through genuine and effective links as defined by the subjective criteria evinced by
the Universal Declaration.
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See discussion supra, pp. 7-8.

12j See discussion
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supra, pp. 8-9.

See discussion supm, pp. 10- 11.

